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On 13 February 2021, the new Prime Minister Mario Draghi was sworn in with
his ministers by President Mattarella. Draghi had received the task of forming the
government on 3 February, ten days earlier. The second Conte government had
resigned on 26 January. The new government won the confidence of the Senate
on 17 February and that of the Chamber of Deputies on the 18th: the crisis was
resolved within eighteen days (twenty-three if the two parliamentary votes are taken
into account). It must be emphasized that in Italy the government does not take
office after the parliamentary vote, but before, with the oath of office (Art. 93 It.
Const.). This is fundamental to understand the role of the Head of State.
New but not unprecedented
The Draghi government is the 63rd since when the Constitution came into force, 73
years ago; and the 17th since 1994 (after the crisis of the first party system). The
average duration has been 14 months, but has risen to 20 since 1994.
The new government has 23 ministers, 8 of whom are women; 15 of them belong
to the parties that voted for it, 8 are independent personalities. All 23 were chosen
by the Prime Minister, in accordance with constitutional provisions, but there is little
doubt that those eight have been more immediate chosen by Draghi: Justice Minister
Marta Cartabia, until December 2020 president of the Constitutional Court, stands
out; to the others Draghi entrusts – to put it briefly – the entire responsibility for
relaunching the economy and managing the 210 billion euro National Recovery and
Resilience Plan. It is notable that nine ministers were also present in the Conte II
government: the foreign minister Di Maio (the prominent leader of the M5Stelle), the
independent interior minister Lamorgese and the health minister Speranza (leader
of the Liberi ed Uguali party): This last choice indicates the will to pursue a certain
continuity in the fight against the pandemic, recognising that – on this – the Conte
government had not done badly.
262 senators out of 321, almost 82% of the plenum, and 545 deputies out of 630,
almost 87%, voted in favour of Draghi and his government. All the parliamentary
groups except Fratelli d’Italia (the right-wing party led by Giorgia Meloni, leader of
the ECR, the European Conservatives and Reformists Party) and 36 M5Stelle MPs
(15 in the Senate and 21 in the Chamber: for this reason they were expelled from
their movement). It is a very large Grosse Koalition, but not unprecedented: the
Monti government was supported by 285 senators and 550 deputies; and, further
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back in time, the Andreotti “national solidarity” government in 1978 , by 267 senators
and 545 deputies.
In his first speech, Draghi spoke of a “government of national unity and
responsibility”, in response to the President of the Republic’s call for a cabinet
“that does not identify with any political formula”. This is the sixth government led
by a non-parliamentarian since 1993: it was preceded by the Ciampi government
(1993-1994), the Dini government (1995-1996), the Monti government (2011-2013),
and the Conte governments (1918-1921). The greatest similarity is with the first
one, which was also made up of both ministers of party extraction and independent
ministers (the other two were composed only of non-parliamentary independents).
Context matters
A few words on the context in which the birth of the Draghi government should be
placed. Several things stand out:
1. A legislature marked by the electoral triumph of the M5Stelle party (initially 32%
of parliamentarians) and by the succession of two governments built around the
M5Stelle party but of opposite sign: the first with the Lega (the largest party in the
right-wing coalition) and the second with the Pd (the largest of the left-wing coalition).
2. The successive strong change in the opinions of the electorate, confirmed by
the 2019 European elections (increase in right-wing parties, sharp drop in Silvio
Berlusconi’s party which belongs to the European People’s Party, collapse in support
for the M5Stelle).
3. The enactment of a constitutional revision that provides for a drastic reduction in
the number of deputies and senators, almost 40% less; as a result, an exceptionally
high number of MPs have no chance of being re-elected (which makes all
parliamentary groups very much opposed to an early dissolution).
4. A party system in search of a new balance, with 15% of MPs and 18% of senators
having – since 2018 – left one parliamentary group to join another (including 84
M5stelle MPs). 5. The approach of the six-month period preceding the expiry of
the mandate, in which the President of the Republic under art. 88.2 Const. cannot
dissolve the chambers.
Conte’s undoing
The resignation of the second Conte government has been caused by the exit from
the majority of the parliamentary groups of Italia Viva, the split party founded by
the former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, weak in the polls (about 3%) but strong in
parliamentary seats (18 in the Senate and 28 deputies). Renzi is the one who in
August 2019 had promoted the birth of Conte’s second cabinet to block Salvini’s
quest for power. The government, politically characterised by the abandonment
of sovereignist and anti-EU policies, had operated acceptably with regard to the
pandemic, but was weakened by the contrasts between the parties of its majority;
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it seemed incapable of strategic vision in relation to the decisive National Recovery
and Resilience Plan (NRRP); it remained very divided on justice and other crucial
issues. Moreover, Giuseppe Conte, after a hard apprenticeship, had revealed
himself to be a strong centraliser determined to run the NRRP alone, entrusting
a single person of his trust, the anti-Covid czar Arcuri, with all sorts of decisive
dossiers, refusing to delegate the supervision of the secret services (unlike all his
predecessors) and ultimately inclined to found his own party.
Conte tried to react to Renzi’s attack with the same method used to liquidate
Matteo Salvini in 2019: replacing his votes with the votes of others, to be found in
Parliament. But he failed to do so: hence his resignation on 26 January.
President Mattarella, having consulted the parliamentary groups, first entrusted a so-
called exploratory assignment to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Fico,
of the M5Stelle party. When Fico certified that there was no parliamentary support
for a third Conte government, tje head of state appealed to all the parliamentary
groups to support a “government with a high profile”, formed by a person of his
trust outside any party. This on the grounds that it was inappropriate to dissolve the
Chambers (due to the pandemic and the NPRR’s European deadlines). Hours later
he entrusted the task to the Italian who enjoys the greatest prestige in Europe and
the world, former ECB president (and former governor of the Bank of Italy) Mario
Draghi.
In his speech to the Senate, Draghi presented a strongly reformist and pro-European
programme (within the NATO framework) featuring the revision of the Italian NRRP,
ecological transition, digital economy, strategic increase in female employment and
empowerment through the training of human capital, a plan expressly aimed at future
generations.
Parliamentary or presidential?
What does the formation of this new cabinet mean within the frame of the Italian form
of government as dictated by the 1948 Constitution?
In fact the birth of the Draghi’s government has aroused some debate among
constitutionalists, in particular between those who wanted to see in it a sort of
healthy ‘return to the Constitution’ (as if it were possible and appropriate to downsize
if not exclude political parties from the function of government) and those who saw
in it the umpteenth sign of the system’s difficulties. According to the former, not only
has the new government been created in full compliance with constitutional rules,
which is absolutely true, but it is also a clear application of what the Constitution
provides for. According to the others, however, the sixth government led by a non-
parliamentarian, the fourth one actually suggested if not imposed by the head of
state (after Ciampi, Dini and Monti), is a clear demonstration of a more and more
inadequate regime.
The fact is that the Italian Constitution, compared to the others after the Second
World War, starting with the Grundgesetz, is characterised by the essentiality of
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the provisions on the formation of the government and the fiduciary relationship,
deprived of any rationalisation tool. This gives the system great flexibility and
constitutes the legal prerequisite for enhancing the role of the President of the
Republic in his surrogate role as guardian of governability. At the time of the Monti
government, the Economist spoke of president Napolitano as Italy’s nanny. There
are those who extol this ability of the legal system to adapt to the most difficult and
unpredictable circumstances and those, like myself, who are concerned about it.
There is little doubt that the theory according to which the Italian form of government
is a parliamentary regime with a particularly strong presidential role (dualist it can
be called), according to Philippe Lauvaux’s formula (see Les grandes démocraties
contemporaines, with Armel Le Divellec, Paris, Puf, 2015), has been corroborated
once more. But the problem is: Is this what the founding fathers really expected? The
answer is a resounding “no”. Is it physiological or is it pathological?
Unresolved questions of legitimacy
The point is that the recent European constitutions which have provided for a
significant, if not predominant, role for the head of state have all provided for forms
of direct legitimacy of the president, in order to ensure, through direct election, a
continuum between the popular will expressed by the citizens and the investiture
of the figure at the top of the state. To this end, in Italy unresolved questions of
legitimacy and political responsibility of the Presidency definitely remain.
This said, what can be expected in the next two years, between now and the end
of the parliamentary term? Is it plausible to think that the age-old problems of Italy’s
political institutions will be dealt with by parliamentary groups while Mario Draghi
and his government try to make public administrations more efficient and the Italian
economy more productive? This is exactly what Italian politicians have talked about
on other occasions, starting with Mario Monti’s own experience. The mantra read:
the government deals with the crisis, the political forces devote themselves to
political reforms for the future. Unfortunately, it did not work then and it will not work
this time: it is hard to imagine that a political system in complete turmoil can make
strategic institutional choices. And there is no doubt that the next two years might
produce yet another realignment of the party system: according to many, in fact,
the sovereignist-European cleavage will be replaced by the more classic right-left
cleavage.
The most relevant consequence that can be expected is that this will lead to
the abandonment of plans to further proportionalise the current electoral law.
Indeed, compared to a few months ago, it is now excluded that the advocates of
proportional representation (M5S, Pd, Leu, Italia Viva) could find the needed support
in Berlusconi’s party. On the other hand, a League that is part of the majority and is a
supporter of majority formulas (like Fratelli d’Italia, some minor forces and part of the
PD itself) should easily be able to block proportionalist changes.
All in all, concerning political reforms, the most that can be hoped for is that the
Chambers would prepare for the next streamlined legislature (with 600 members
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instead of 945): passing new Standing Orders and a constitutional reform that unifies
the electorate of the Chamber and the Senate (today only citizens who are 25 vote
for the Senate!). That would already be a lot.
There is one last unknown factor.
How much time will Draghi’s government be given to relaunch Italy? The legislature
should last until 2023, but in a year from now a new President of the Republic is to
be elected. Draghi, of course, is a very strong candidate. At that point the dilemma
will be: to elect him to the highest political office (but with limited government
tasks) and find a successor who will continue his programme, or to elect another
personality as president while he continues until the end of the term?
Strong pressure is already looming to ask President Mattarella, as Napolitano in his
days, to be available for re-election…
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